Home » Egypt vs. Iran: revolutions and coups

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Egypt vs. Iran: revolutions and coups — 14 Comments

  1. I think that the 14 million (?) persons demonstration in Egypt was not about religion or freedom but was about incipient starvation. Egypt must import food and energy, it has lost its tourist income, and it has no money. The only remotely likely source of financial support is Saudi Arabia, but not if Egypt is controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. The Saudis fear the Muslim Brotherhood as a destabilizer of their society even more than they fear Iran. I think the Egyptians will choose avoiding starvation in preference to the Muslim Brotherhood.

  2. So, why hasn’t the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt followed the path of Khomeini in simply killing the opposition? I submit that it’s for three reasons: Morsi isn’t a tower of ruthlessness like Khomeini…; Morsi lacks the political support, spooky presence, and aura of sanctity that Khomeini had built up; and public relations has become more important to dictators in this digital age in which opposition can be organized through Facebook and Twitter, and the whole world is watching far more intently.

    I’m sure you know a lot more about this than I do, so feel free to correct me. But I don’t buy any of the above 3 reasons:
    1) I think the Muslim Brotherhood is plenty brutal–if they feel they can get away with it. I suspect Morsi felt he didn’t have enough power to simply kill the opposition’s leaders.

    2) I don’t think Facebook and Twitter mean much if you can go the Khomeini route. Given enough power, I don’t believe these folks give a rat’s ass about “public relations.”

    I think the only thing preventing this from turning into an Iran-style bloodbath was that Morsi did not control the military. Clearly he did not and had something to fear:

    I see that the military in Egypt has now arrested many Brotherhood leaders. That sort of thing has been going on in Egypt since the Nasser era, although Nasser himself was more Draconian, establishing concentration camps for the Brotherhood and torturing them, although only killing a few.

  3. Gary:

    But I’m in agreement with you.

    My reasons 1 and 2 are tied together; I thought that was clear, but perhaps I did not make it clear enough. Morsi isn’t able to be “a tower of ruthlessness” because he doesn’t have the religious clout and the popular support and the reputation that Khomeini had, at least that Khomeini had at the outset.

    But my other point is that, when Khomeini began to lose some of his popular and political support, he pressed forward to simply murder the opposition. Morsi has not done that (so far) and I’m not sure he can do it now, although I have little doubt the Brotherhood would do it if they could get away with it and if they thought it necessary. I think they thought it was unnecessary because they were winning without it.

    Also, Nasser and Sadat and Mubarak kept the Brotherhood in check until Mubarak was toppled. That was always the danger inherent in Mubarak’s overthrow—that the Brotherhood would take advantage. And they did, but so far they have not slaughtered the opposition as Khomeini did (again, for the reasons I state, not that they don’t have the impulse).

    Khomeini did not control the military either, although he had some supporters there. Khomeini simply executed the leadership of the military. See this.

    And it’s not Twitter and Facebook per se that the Brotherhood fears. It’s just that it’s harder for them to do a lot of really dirty work these days without the world knowing. Not that the world will necessarily do a whole lot about it, but it makes it somewhat harder for them to get counter-propaganda out, and to control their own people. In the end, they can’t murder everyone, although they could try.

  4. I’ve been following fairly closely the Egyptian story since before Mubarak fell and I was 21 when the Shah of Iran was deposed. I agree with neo’s assessment of the Egyptian vs Iran comparison.

    I would only add that Morsi and the Brotherhood were trying a gradual transformation of Egypt. First creating and passing a Shariah compliant constitution and then implementing an incremental replacement of top Army officials. I also suspect that some of Morsi’s apparent lack of ruthlessness may have been due to Obama sending the message not to put the lie to Obama and the media’s characterization of the ‘Arab Spring’ as democratic and essentially peaceful.

    I agree with Jim above that the protests are more about looming starvation than 14 million secularists making their presence felt. Morsi had done and was doing little to nothing in addressing Egypt’s continuing economic crisis.

    In addition, Egypt’s Salafists, while less in number than the Brotherhood, definitely have Khomeini’s brand of ruthlessness. If they manage to get into power it’s highly unlikely that they will fail to quickly and ruthlessly secure their power. I would put their chances at getting into power as at least 50/50. I base that assessment upon one statistic; 84% of Egyptians support the death penalty for apostasy. Egypt is a deeply Islamic country with Cairo having the most mosque’s and minarets of any Muslim country. Part of that reality is sheer population but it’s Egypt’s societal commitment to Islam that prioritized the use of those resources to that end.

  5. As Gary already mentioned, the key difference between Iran then and Egypt now is that the Brothers lack the ability to impose their will on the country.
    However, there’s another important difference that plays into both their ability to attract support and their willingness to commit violence. The Brothers just don’t have the vision that Khomeini did. Underneath it all they’re a sort of tribal group that provides a sense of belonging where the traditional tribes broke down. So what they really care about is helping their tribe at the expense of everyone else. They don’t have a big plan to remake Egypt.

  6. Egypt is a chronic freakin’ disaster, worse after Mubarak’s fall. Tradewise, it produces little. It is not able to feed its people, inflation is significant, unemployment is massive, 50% of Egyptians earn $2 per day or less. It depends on foreign aid and tourism.

    Its major assets are the Suez canal, which Ike was instrumental in keeping Egyptian, after Nasser seized it in 1956; and the peace accord with Israel, part of which requires chronic US subsistence payments to Egypt, currently some $2 billion or more yearly.

    An international welfare ‘client’ with no economic future and lots of needy people utterly devoid of any positive future as long as they stay home.

  7. Would Egypt be more like Iran if it could fall back on oil revenue?

    I wonder what more-extreme elements will rise in Egypt in reaction to the military coup against the Morsi government.

  8. 1) The Emir of Qatar was just swapped out for his (saner) son the other day. Until that moment, Qatar was spending like crazy to support Cairo.
    2) Morsi was economically/ functionally insane when he put a fanatic ‘in charge’ of the Luxor temple complex. The fanatic was, and is, directly associated with those who’d shot tourists into hamburger years ago. Tour cancellations flew in over the Internet. But Luxor is mated to Giza. So those tour Euros went bye-bye, too.
    3) Promptly after 1 & 2 the public filled the square. Protest became job one. The top brass were wigg’n.
    4) KSA gave the generals the nod: Riyadh has their back.
    5) The generals frantically moved to protect their sole remaining cash machine: the canal.
    6) The Creole Communist soaked his crying towel — and so his czars are looking over how to foul up the Egyptian economy — even more.
    7) Morsi’s BFF — the mullahs of Tehran — must now cry into their turbans.
    8) Expect events in Gaza.
    9) BTW, Israel is in a position to sell natural gas to Egypt and Jordan — if they can bear to pay for it. The pipelines are already in place.

  9. “Would Egypt be more like Iran if it could fall back on oil revenue?” Eric

    That seems very likely. But as Don Carlos points out, Egypt is unable to support itself. Whether the new Emir of Qatar will stay is unknown but while he lasts the only regimes able to economically assist Egypt are the Saudi’s and less so, Qatar. I’ve seen estimates that 20 billion a year in direct economic assistance is needed to keep Egypt economically stable. That’s separate from the 2-3 billion in military assistance provided by the US. While neither the Saudi’s nor the new Emir of Qatar will support radical Islamic elements, which favors the Army and secular elements.

    All of this is in contradiction to the factors that favor the Islamists. So, we’ll just have to wait and see how it all shakes out.

  10. One last thought, if the extreme Salafists were to seize power and executed a Khomieni like purge of the army, they could use the Egyptian army to seize the eastern Libyan oil fields. They’re lightly defended, especially now and could easily be ‘annexed’ by Egypt’s military. Those oil fields would provide the revenue Egypt needs to assume an Iran like stance.

  11. I’ve thought about eastern Libyan oil & gas for Egypt too. The guns there are jihadist, and might mesh with the MB.

  12. Neo says: “But remember, just because Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood has not gone the Khomeini route so far doesn’t mean they won’t in the future.”
    In reading this post, the first thing that comes to mind is something along those lines. Morsi or his successor probably won’t make the same mistake again if given the opportunity, and the military was probably thinking the same thing when they decided to act.

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