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Telegraphing the plan — 20 Comments

  1. The primary strategic weakness is the close margin of support for continued fighting in Iraq. This weakness is telegraphed daily by the NYT and major media.

    Tactically, the insurgents would know almost immediately when the surge started.

    The strategic strength of this message is the commitment of forces itself, even if for a limited period of time, and changes in the rules of engagement.

    There will be tactical surprises in the actual mission, and on balance, the telegraphing of the surge and change of ROE more than offsets any benefit of surprise.

  2. While living in the UK I had the chance to ask the Minister of Defense on a TV program why during WWII the BBC offered those wondeful coded messages to occupied Europe and today they telegraph battle plans with beautiful color graphics along with a discription of the political sensitivities of the battle operations on-air and presumably straight into the dens of the terrorists. He did not have a good answer.

  3. No. Strategies that depend on surprise are not strategies, they are tactics and operational details.

    This is almost a matter of definition, because strategies are not executed over the course of hours or days, they are executed over the course of months, years, or in some cases, even decades. As such, if your strategy requires your opposition to be surprised month after month by your strategic approach, your strategy is doomed to failure. In that case, you are implicitly assuming that your opponents are stupid, in which case, why do you need a strategy in the first place?

  4. Buying time for the Kurds, who are are wise enough to lay the groundwork for viable independence, wise enough to hedge their bet.

    A Kurdish State is the goal. Kurdistan would exist as a thorn in the side of all our natural enemies in the region: Iran, Turkey, Syria, and the Sunni Arabs; Kurdistan would work well with all our natural friends in the region: Greece, Israel, Armenia, Cyprus and the Lebanese Christians.

  5. This is my question: doesn’t a speech like Bush’s, in which a strategic plan is outlined, give the enemy the advantage of knowing in advance what the approach will be, and take away any element of surprise?

    It depends. They already know that more troops were coming, meaning the media told them.

    At this moment, Neo, telegraphing doesn’t really matter. Because the plan is going to get screwed when it contacts the enemy no matter what. What does matter, is if you adapt while fighting Better than the enemy does. There is not a lot of surprises in this war, Neo. Meaning, they know who their enemies are, and we know who are our enemies are. There is no “conspiratorial” insurgency here, hiding in government or whatever. We know who our enemies are, we just need to go get them.

    Democracies demand such things, especially modern democracies. But it seems to be a potential problem of some magnitude in waging any war, conventional or assymetrical, does it not?

    It is a potential problem, but do it Sun Tzu’s way. Meaning, make your weakness into a strength. How? Well, you could for example use speeches to give disinformation to the enemy, but I don’t think that is what Bush has done. Most probably, you can turn the open ended nature of 21st century insurgency against our enemies by using communications tools to improve the Morale of your allies. The Kurds, the Iraqis, our potential allies, the blogosphere, and the American public. You don’t really need psychological operations from the President’s house in order to help clean out terrorists. Assuming that such a psychological operation would ever be started from the President’s work given Bush’s chronic honesty.

    So make the best of the situation. You need to improve the morale of your allies. And when you do so, when you stiffen them up, then you can order them to annihilate the enemy. We have the brute power to do so, but we lack the will component, so therefore worrying about speeches notifying the terrorists of our intentions is not very important. Because they can’t do anything with it. What can terrorists do differently now that they know? They can’t go hiding. Why? Because as the newest Counter Insurgency Manual just told us, insurgencies acquire power by creating chaos and then doing the extortion-protection racket game. But when they succede in doing that as the first part of the insurgency, this means THEY are in Power. This means they are now responsible for security. They can’t run anymore. They can run when they have no strongholds. But Sadr? Those Baghdad Sunnis? Their enclaves have been safe from American attack for a long long time now, given the limitations placed on American soldiers.

    So in an ironic sense, Neo. Counter-insurgency becomes easier, the more your enemy wins. That is why it is a tug of war, why it seems to go Up and Down, and then to repeat this cycle again.

    More or less I agree with Marcus, Neo. Even if our enemies know what we are

  6. up to, it doesn’t matter if they can’t counter it. What really does matter, is if you give your enemy 12 months to prepare. Even if the enemy KNOWs you are going to attack and where, they still need TIME to fortify. From recent news, it doesn’t look like the US is giving them that time. Not like Bush gave Saddam in 2002, you know.

  7. I hope you are right and it isn’t too much of a drawback. But specifically, I was thinking of Sadr and his people–if they know we’re finally coming for him, what’s to stop him from just leaving the area for a while and then returning when the dust settles? He knows it’s time-limited; we can’t stay forever because of public opinion in the US. I also understand that he probably is in the place where he has most support right now, and any move might be difficult. But it still could be done, I would think.

  8. He can’t leave with much, Neo, because he would snap his link to power. He might save his own skin, but without a source of power, he is as good as dead. And remember, Neo, this isn’t Fallujah 2. It depends on how much time Sadr has, how long the US forces will wait. If the US forces and Iraqi allies wait for the city to evacuate, then ya sure Sadr will be gone probably unless he is suicidal. But if it is true what you say that ROE has been changed, then this will be a test of it. If they go in with the Iraqis with full firepower without waiting for any evacuations, then that would mean ROEs have been changed.

    This all assumes that Sadr city is a target, of course, that is still not that clear.

    if they know we’re finally coming for him, what’s to stop him from just leaving the area for a while and then returning when the dust settles?

    Worst case scenario, Neo? Basically what I was thinking. Kill Sadr, and then move in the Marines to take and hold that city, and just occupy, make it their own. If you can’t kill Sadr, if he just runs away, then you keep on holding the city. Maybe Sadr will come back with an Iranian funded military force, and we can have a second chance at killing him. But without his power base amongst the poor, Neo, Sadr will not be much of a problem. And his power base amongst the poor, will be totally destroyed when the US Marines are allowed to do whatever is needed to Cut his power base away from him, through eliminating competition to the US firepower and through substituting US reconstruction funds for Sadr socialism.

    Sadr is running some kind of infiltration and subterfuge campaign in the Shia government. And he does this through his political base.

    I suspect any target city or area will be closed off, pretty fast. The usual way these “partner” operations operate, in my memory, is that US forces hold the perimeter to contain the forces, while the Iraqis go inside and clean them out. But in this case, it might be more mixed. The details are not available at the moment. I mean before when it was all about the “Iraqi face”, they didn’t want US soldiers to fight right next to Iraqis as they went into mosques and what not. That seemd to be a little counter-productive to me, but still. It will increase the Iraqi morale and unit discipline if they See Americans fighting by them. So I don’t want to see the American brigades just holding the perimeter.

    But it still could be done, I would think.

    He can do it of course, but that doesn’t mean he will or even that he should. He will lose much of his power base either way, if Sadr city is one of the targets to be annihilated and held.

    The US has learned much concerning assassination techniques, Neo. If Bush gives the order, Sadr is as good as dead.

    He can run, like Saddam ran, but he’ll be just as dead. Because even if Bush doesn’t kill him, the next President will, even if we do leave. He won’t be around the enjoy it.

    One of the

  9. things is, Neo, is whether Sadr believes we will come for him. Afte r all, didn’t we try before and he stopped them? *shrugs* he may not believe we are serious this time. Another benefit to “losing” an insurgency, because when you do fight back, everyone is surprised.

  10. Physically, yes, al-Sadr can leave, but if he does so, he loses influence on the ground in real-time, because he’ll have to use an elaborate chain of go-betweens. Whatever command and control system he’s got will be degraded by all that.

    Another drawback (for him, obviously) is that if he has any sufficiently charismatic and ambitious subordinates, they will regard that as their moment to move and take control; if he does not have any sufficiently charismatic followers, then more sober voices like al-Sistani will exert themselves and start eroding his base.

  11. Neo, there might actually be another Civil War during the next hundred years here in the United States. Depends on how the War on Terror goes. If it goes bad, there will come a time when each state will have to decide whether they really are being protected by the Union of Democrats.

    If the Democrats really love their power, if they really knew what was in their own enlightened self-interest, they and their allies on the Left would be doing everything in their power to help Bush win the war.

  12. Bush Speaks and Base Is Subdued

    By SHERYL GAY STOLBERG
    Published: January 12, 2007
    The New York Times

    FORT BENNING, Ga., Jan. 11 —

    President Bush came to this Georgia military base looking for a friendly audience to sell his new Iraq strategy. But his lunchtime talk received a restrained response from soldiers who clapped politely but showed little of the wild enthusiasm that they ordinarily shower on the commander in chief […]

    Full text: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/12/us/12prexy.html?_r=1&ref=world&oref=slogin

  13. You pose a good question. First, while insurgents and terrorists know, in broad strokes, what we intend to do, they don’t know where the units will be deployed. Yeah Baghdad but, it’s a big city. And they don’t know when the troops will arrive. Or when they will start operating. Or with what orders. Or with what intelligence. Or with what support (air, special forces, etc).

    Second, force matters. Force of will and brute force. They may know, again, in broad stokes, what we intend to do but, they can’t deter us and once we start, they don’t have a chance in hell of winning.

  14. “Military Times” poll, carried out by the U.S Armed Forces leading
    (Gannett-owned) newspaper:

    It is based on a mail survey of the paper’s active-duty military subscribers, two thirds of whom have deployed to Iraq
    or Afghanistan at least once.

    Here are the most relevant findings on active duty military opinion:

    * Percentage who feel that “success in Iraq is likely”: 50% (down from an
    “optimistic” peak of 83% in 2004)

    * Percent who approve of the way President Bush is handling the war: 35%
    (down from 63% in 2004)

    * Percent who disapprove of Bush’s handling of the war: 42%

    * Percent who think the U.S. should have gone to war in Iraq in the first
    place: 41% (down from 65% in 2003) – four points lower than the general
    U.S. population (45%) in a recent USA Today/Gallup poll

    * Percent who think U.S. should have NO TROOPS in Iraq: 13%

    full story: http://www.zmag.org/content/showarticle.cfm?SectionID=51&ItemID=11826

  15. I tend to agree, if a “strategy” as broad as what was said gives them what they need to win then the strategy was flawed to begin with. I would prefer it be secret, but it doesn’t have to be.

    In cryptography there is a saying “security through obscurity is not security”. While the type of security in that statement is different from what is referenced here, I think the saying holds.

    Lets face it – saying we were going to invade Europe through France with a large amphibian force sometime in the summer of 1944 wouldn’t change much. Everyone knew it anyway, there was no way to hide it – in fact if done well allowing them to know the strategy can allow you tactics that you wouldn’t have otherwise (such as the deception in the d-day invasion).

    I would rather suspect that this has been in the plans for a while and troops have been shifted around already. If not, then the leaders *really* need fired. I would rather suspect that if people like Sadr’s militia tried to flee it would be for a fairly short run followed by death.

  16. Neo,

    Good question. First, there is some evidence that parts of the new strategy were going into effect even before the President gave his speech. See, e.g., here:

    http://iraqthemodel.blogspot.com/2007/01/did-operation-actually-begin.html

    Second, one of the big benefits of the new strategy is (hopefully) to reassure Iraqis that we aren’t about to abandon our allies in the country. So long as Iraqis doubt our commitment, they will be hesitant to do anything to anger the anti-U.S. forces, for fear that they will pay for it after we leave. By announcing the plan publicly, we reaffirm our commitment to success in Iraq, which is a big deal just in itself.

  17. It depends on the purpose of the speech. Were it intended to explain a strategy that might end the internecine fighting in Iraq and impose order, you are correct, it would give away the plot to our enemies and defeat the strategy. But if the purpose of the speech is to make a political statement for domestic audiences and try to establish one’s legacy as someone who should not be blamed for the eventual chaos in Iraq, then it isn’t as important.

  18. i think neo is right. for a host of reasons we are always giving the leaders of radical islam hints about the future. besides military strategy we afford them the comfort of knowing that the ultimate solution, as stated, is always bottom up–long years of struggle changing hearts and minds etc while leaving the purveyors in position to continue spreading this cancer. is there really any difference between radical islam and malignant cancer cells?

    is there any argument about who the principal leaders are these days? are they not the leaders of iran, syria, hamas, hezzbollah, al sadr brigades and saudi arabia to name a few? are they not the monsters that spew genocide at their podiums and sanction it at their mosques there and throughout europe and the US?

    my question to all these esteemed writers, pundits, politicians and thinkers is: if radical islam is such a threat why are its political/spiritual leaders allowed to live? we know where they are. why do we have to contemplate bombing entire countries when we could start with the leaders first? would we not have attempted to kill hitler and his generals if we knew where they were?”

    again, bush spoke about the devastation that syria and iran are bringing to bear on iraq. for every jihadi we kill or capture they send two while armchair pundits here discuss tactics about troop levels. it’s so pathetic. my question remains, Why do we let them kill us on a daily basis while we fete these leaders at the UN, our politicians kneel at their feet for TV primetime and these genocidal monsters jet about spewing their murderous ideaology? on a positive note more and more pundits are at least now admitting that we should have shot al sadr on site several years ago. how long will it take to come to the same conclusion about the sudanese, iranian, syrian, hamas and hezzbollah leadership? they should be executed on the same night without warning. we can deal with the UN and world opinion afterwards–not beforehand as we do now.

  19. Why do we let them kill us on a daily basis while we fete these leaders at the UN, our politicians kneel at their feet for TV primetime and these genocidal monsters jet about spewing their murderous ideaology?

    Because people like Rodney keep getting in the way of unbridled American power. So if you can get rid of them, things would be different. But since you can’t, things stay as the status quo. America’s been a divided nation since the Revolutionary War and the Civil War. But not WWII because Lincoln and his Republicans wasn’t in power then. Whenever there is a Republican leading a war for the nation, the Democrats are always sympathetic to the enemy. That is almost like a universal constant there.

  20. It really has to do with fear. Americans know that deep down in their hearts that if they unleash Pandora’s Box on the world, that there will be no turning back. So long as things don’t seem too bad, and so long as Americans can be rather isolationist based with safety, Americans do not have to open Pandora’s Box. And a lot of Ameicans feel a rather relief, that the responsibility of the world is Not in their hands. But if you open Pandora’s Box, then America will be more powerful, yes, but we will also have a lot more responsibility on our shoulders. Crushing, mountainous responsibility, perhaps for centuries. Bush’s plan is to get nations responsible for themselves through limited use of American might. Raising up the might of Iraqis, allows America to stand back, and not open Pandora’s Box. Because if America released the secret limitations upon American power, the world will know true terror then and will pray for the next century at least, against their mistake in goading America on.

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